| Energy Deregulation:
Lessons from the Golden State
by Mafruza Khan
On April 25 the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, reversing their previous stance, offered
Californians some respite from the energy crisis in their state by
imposing broad price controls on electricity sales in California. Under
the order, price controls would be triggered only if grid managers
declare an emergency because electricity reserves fell to below 7
percent. The decision goes against the Bush administration's position
opposing federal intervention in the state's energy market. The caps are
to go into effect May 1 and last for a year and should help California
save billions of dollars it would otherwise pay to electricity
generators that state officials have accused of price gouging. The
state's energy crisis, the result of a flawed deregulation effort that
has been manipulated by corporations and politicians, should serve as a
lesson for the remaining 42 states that are planning to deregulate
electricity in the future.
In a few short weeks during the summer
of 1996, the California legislature rushed through AB1890, the energy
deregulation bill that is now being regarded as a colossal failure by
all and blamed for the state's ongoing energy crisis. As one writer
comments, "If California's misbegotten electricity deregulation
scheme is ever reduced to canvas or film, the artist would have to be
some cross between Hieronymus Bosch and Federico Fellini. At one level,
it is a surreal story of grossly compounded economic errors, at another,
a gruesome morality tale."
It isn't very hard to understand why
AB1890 did not work it was based on wrong assumptions, incorrect
forecasting and manipulated by corporate executives and politicians. The
consequences of the bill - in addition to up to a 46 percent rate hike
for consumers, $4.6 billion in taxpayer monies spent by the state to pay
for electricity in the spot market, and a backlash on environmental
regulations, including a resurgence of nuclear power - remain to be seen
(and felt) in the future. It has also led to the largest investor-owned
utility bankruptcy filing in history (the third-largest corporate
bankruptcy filing ever) by Pacific Gas and Electric Company.
AB1890: LOSERS AND WINNERS
The utilities contend that they are the
victims of deregulation, which brought about their financial crisis by
allowing wholesale prices to skyrocket and prevented them from passing
on the additional costs to consumers by capping retail prices. In
reality, according to consumer advocates, lobbyists for the utility
companies all but wrote the deregulation bill and company bosses
publicly rejoiced when then-Governor Pete Wilson signed the bill. They
also spent more than $45 million in 1998 to beat an initiative that
would have restored the old system. Consumer advocates criticize the
bankruptcy filing pointing out that the utility's parent company has
been making huge profits during the crisis through other subsidiaries.
"The parent company has $30 billion, much of what it has siphoned
out of the utility coffers. It would have bailed the utility out,"
allege the Foundation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights. Bankruptcy
experts say that Pacific Gas and Electric's creditors will target $4.63
billion the utility transferred to its parent company while receiving no
investment in return. The only losers in this entire ordeal are
customers.
The other group that milked the bungled
deregulation efforts and have been accused of manipulating the market
are energy wholesalers. California's Independent System Operator (ISO),
which manages the statewide transmission grid, has accused power
generators of overcharging Californians by $6.2 billion since last May.
The profits of out of state companies like Enron, Duke Energy, Reliant
Energy and Dynergy have been at record levels; their stock prices have
also soared in the midst of a depressed market. The Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) has indicated that it may order some
refunds because of price gouging by these firms, most of which are
headed by major contributors to Bush's various political campaigns. Duke
and Dynergy have challenged the authority of the California Public
Utilities Commission to investigate whether they deliberately reduced
power supplies to drive up prices. California Representative George
Radanovich's request for a General Accounting Office study to
investigate allegations of price gouging and market manipulation has
been granted.
AB1890: IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE
The advertised charm of deregulation
was the promise of lower power rates under the presumption that the
state had an enduring surplus of generating capacity. In theory, by
breaking up the utility monopolies, i.e., Pacific Gas and Electric,
Southern California Edison and San Diego Gas and Electric, the state
would foster competition and drive down rates. The utilities were thus
required to sell off their power plants to independent generators who
would produce power more efficiently, the parent holding companies could
expand into other businesses and their utility subsidiaries would become
primarily distribution systems. Profits would help pay off billions of
dollars in 'stranded costs' poured into the construction of nuclear
power plants, alternative energy and pricey natural gas contracts during
the eighties. Consumers would get a mandated 10 percent rate reduction
and the new rates would be frozen until March 2002 for most customers.
This model was based on a number of
assumptions that included excess capacity lasting until 2005. (In 1994
state officials estimated that California had a 30 percent reserve
margin in electric supply.) An economic boom led to an energy shortage
by mid-1999. There was also a belief that the extremely low mid-1990s
price of natural gas the fuel that powers roughly 40 percent of
California's electricity generators - would prevail. Instead natural gas
prices have quadrupled in the past year and continue to rise. The gas
price increases, however, don't come close to explaining the run-up in
wholesale electricity rates, which bear no relation to the cost of
generation. Natural gas suppliers have also been accused of conspiring
to manipulate the supply of natural gas driving up prices and the cities
of Los Angeles and Long Beach have sued Southern California Gas Company,
San Diego Gas and Electric and other gas companies in relation to these
allegations. California also forced its utilities to buy all their power
from the now defunct California Power Exchange, a newly formed
auction-like marketplace for buyers and sellers that was supposedly
intended to reduce collusion in bidding. The arrangement in reality made
the whole system so opaque that there was no way for regulators or the
public to know even after the fact whether there might have been
collusion. State regulators also saw unscrupulous energy brokers set up
shop with little regulation in the deregulated environment. (On top of
all this, a prolonged drought in the Northwest dried all the dams and
limited the supply of hydroelectric power that was available for
California.)
This scheme seemed to work initially
and spot rates stayed low while surplus generating capacity remained.
But once demand surged while supply remain fixed, the new system raised
spot prices and the utilities ended up with an astronomical bill for
their purchases. While this much is true, it still does not clear the
utility companies of manipulating the situation. The California Public
Utility Commission has been trying to determine how much of the
utilities' professed $12 billion debt for wholesale power is real and to
what extent it is merely an accounting trick in which income,
particularly from the sale of power from plants the companies and their
subsidiaries own outside California "goes into one corporate pocket
even as the other pocket is turned inside out." The issue was
highlighted further when in January PG&E Corporation, the parent of
Pacific Gas and Electric, won permission from the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission to shield its profits and stockholders from its
subsidiary's debt through a corporate restructuring called 'ring
fencing.' Meanwhile, Californians are left with a bill of more than $4
billion that Governor Gray Davis has spent buying power on the expensive
spot market on behalf of the utilities.
The question then arises as to why
Governor Davis spent taxpayer money bailing out the utilities when he
could have purchased every power plant in the state for less money.
According to some, maybe it was because current and former utility
executives are acting as paid consultants to the governor. Or, maybe the
governor's decisions are influenced by the $112,258 he received as
political contributions from PG&E in 1999 and in the first half of
2000.
ENERGY DEREGULATION: CAN IT EVER WORK
Other issues emerge that are relevant
not only for California but also for the rest of the nation considering
deregulation of electricity. These include: examining whether
deregulation is inherently a bad idea or did California just bungle it
up; does California need more plants for producing power and if it does
what kind of capacity will be generating the additional power; and
finally what are the implications of these events in California.
The first thing that must be understood
is that electricity is not like any other commodity and cannot be stored
in any significant amounts. Consequently, supply and demand has to be
finely balanced by the transmission system. There may be ample supply
for most of the day, but when demand spikes, especially on days of
extreme temperatures, the price paid for the peak hours can be, and was,
astronomical. Everything sold on the spot market for any given period
goes at the market-clearing price, which is the highest price paid for
that period. In December 2000, wholesale power that had cost an average
of $30 per megawatt in the previous year sold at an average of $330 and
went up to $1,200 sometimes.
An analysis by the Energy Group at the
Tellus Institute, a Boston consulting firm, conclude that "even
under the best of circumstances, the deregulation of energy cannot be
trusted to deliver on its many promises." They note that some
marginal increases in efficiency would occur in an ideal market an
unlikely real world situation. Most states cannot expect market prices
(determined by the marginal costs of new supplies) to be lower than
regulated rates (determined by lower average embedded costs of existing
supplies) would have been in the near future, by definition, unless
deregulated markets can generate large efficiency improvements that
regulated rates cannot. In California's unregulated environment, there
is no mechanism to guarantee adequacy and reliability of supply. In
theory, when supply is low, new generators will enter the field, but
market uncertainties, restrictions to access and other real world
constraints hardly ever assure such outcomes. In California, such
constraints took the form of price gouging and the emergence of greedy
power brokers who manipulated the spot market.
Combined with rising oil and gas
prices, which raises the price of all energy, and with the possibility
of players who find that gaming the market is much more lucrative than
trying to streamline their business for competitive advantage under
deregulation, the result would be a huge loss of benefits earned from
low embedded costs of existing supplies. In addition, a deregulated
environment also offers few incentives to encourage research and
development of more environmentally friendly or socially desirable
energy sources.
Another recent study by the consulting
firm Booz-Allen & Hamilton finds that energy deregulation has caused
significant difficulties for most industrial and commercial customers
and companies that benefited used experts who understood the emerging
energy markets. The study also finds that differences in state
regulatory rules concerning wholesale and retail power were a key
influence on energy prices. The example that is often cited is the
difference between energy deregulation in Pennsylvania and California.
Compared to California's failed
experiment with energy deregulation, Pennsylvania's experience has been
a fairly positive one, says Sonow Popowski, the official consumer
advocate of the state. (For more details check out www.electrichoice.com)
Pennsylvania's electric rates were 15 percent higher than the national
average before deregulation, they are lower than the national average
now. According to a study published earlier this year by the Center for
the Advancement of Energy Markets (CAEM), Pennsylvania and New York lead
the nation in establishing policies to encourage retail competition in
electricity markets. The two states scored the highest, 66 and 64 out of
a possible 100 points, in the Retail Energy Deregulation (RED) Index, an
annual scorecard of electricity deregulation, developed using a total of
22 weighted criteria, such as whether a state has a deregulation plan,
how much of a state's market is open to competition, the percentage of
customers that have actually switched to non-utility suppliers, and
whether a state has approved safeguards to ensure fair competition
between utility and non-utility suppliers. (California ranked 13 with a
score of 38, negative scores were assigned to seven states that have
explicitly rejected deregulation, 17 states received scores of zero.)
Only time will prove whether
Pennsylvania's success prevails in the long run. There are, however,
fundamental differences in Pennsylvania's approach to energy
deregulation that explains why it is working at least for now. According
to the CAEM study, Pennsylvania involved affected parties in the process
utilities and suppliers, customers and small businesses,
environmentalists, and other stakeholders. The state has a fair
generation policy that does not require its utilities to sell their
generation plants as part of restructuring and does not prevent
utilities from entering into long-term power contracts with suppliers.
The spot market accounts for only 15% to 30% of all electricity sold.
Pennsylvania started with a generation surplus, continues to have ample
supply and expects to have a 25% increase in new generation capacity
over the next five years. California has made limited investments in
power plants in the last twenty years and supply options are heavily
influenced by environmental guidelines. Pennsylvania uses coal, gas and
nuclear power to generate electricity. Unlike California, the state also
has a reliable transmission infrastructure.
California's experience has served as a
message of caution for some states New Mexico, Nevada, Arkansas,
Mississippi, Oregon, Montana, and Vermont have all taken a step back
from plunging into deregulation. Colorado backed away last year after
doing a careful analysis. The most telling argument against deregulation
is found in the Golden State itself. A general assumption for
deregulation is that publicly owned power systems are not as reliable or
well managed as privately owned utilities. But the publicly owned
utilities like the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power and the
Sacramento Municipal Utility District, which were not covered by the
deregulation law, continue to function without any problems during all
this and have been selling large amounts of excess power to the state
grid. The Los Angeles Department of Water and Power's General Manager,
David Freeman, has been making good use of the additional income from
the state grid toward retiring his utility's debt. This should suffice
as adequate evidence that public managers have been better executives in
recent years in California than corporate kingpins who draw seven figure
salaries and bonuses.
Finally, the signs are clear that
California's energy crisis has precipitated a backlash against
environmental concerns in relation to electricity production. While the
state is spending $20 million on radio and television advertisements
promoting conservation, and two bills creating more than $500 million in
conservation initiatives and incentives have been signed, it is also in
a great hurry to generate more capacity at any cost. Governor Davis is
under pressure to speed up approval for power plant construction by
easing environmental restrictions and has urged approval of a
controversial plant in Silicon Valley. Attempts to bring mothballed
power plants on line is also a source of controversy as plans to
refurbish antiquated plants with state-of-the-art technologies are being
abandoned in favor of quick retooling. Before the crisis, alternative
energy producers (wind, solar, geo-thermal, biomass) produced 30 percent
of California's total electricity. With the utilities defaulting on the
money owed to alternative power producers, they are currently supplying
20 percent of California's power. Regulations to speed the cleansing of
the nation's air and water have become a convenient scapegoat for
California's crisis according to Clean Air Trust, a Washington DC-based
public interest group.
The story of energy deregulation will
unfold over time. The California mess has created two opposite
reactions, that deregulation can never work or that it the only
solution. Much remains to be learned and understood. But a cautionary
approach that has effective checks and controls in place, including
federal legislation in the areas of supply reliability and market power,
are worth pursuing.
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